Future Directions for Nuclear Non-proliferation Policy: An Enhanced Role for Safeguards

PAPER NOT AVAILABLE. ABSTRACT: The extent of Iraqi nuclear development, discovered in the wake of the Gulf War, has raised the question of whether International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards can provide credible assurances that states are not developing nuclear weapons. The Iraqi case demonstrates that safeguards, alone, cannot prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, they do provide an essential element of the non-proliferation regime. It would, therefore, appear prudent to rely on the existing system of safeguards as the foundation of an enhanced nuclear nonproliferation regime. Enhancements to die overall regime could conceivably be developed in two broad areas. First, the current system of safeguards could be bolstered by seeking to increase the transparency of countries' nuclear programs. Second, it may be valuable to explore the possibility of supplementing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its objectives, e.g., by eliciting initial non-proliferation commitments from states that have not yet signed the Treaty, with a view to gaining NPT adherence over the longer term. Some initiatives in these areas are already underway, and others might be warranted. Such efforts need to build on the positive contributions that safeguards have already made to the nuclear non-proliferation regime.