Year
1981
Abstract
President Reagan asks us to \"look to the future with a vision from the past.\" From 1955 to 1967 AEC's safeguards policy relied on criminal penalties in the Atomic Energy Act and on the voluntary protection licensees would provide because of intrinsic values. Regulatory upgrades have followed -- to an extent some argue industry is locked into an endless \"ratcheting\" of mandatory standards. With largely federally funded studies, safeguards technologies have made quantum leaps in sophistication, which the Palm Beach Press last year called \"mindboggling\" and compared to \"a local drive-in's creature feature.\" To enhance overall effectiveness safeguarders could give higher priority to original basics: (1) Criminal penalties may become more effective deterrents by increasing severity, broadening scopes and greater publicity. (2) Current intrinsic value may be an economic self-interest incentive for industry to surpass NRC requirements because of corporate financial exposures besides those covered by safeguards. Some SNM is worth its weight in gold, and TMI-2 suggests either radiological or industrial sabotage of a power reactor could result in staggering uninsured financial losses --millions for replacement power and billions for repairs and cleanup -- and an erosion of the public's confidence. Since worldwide capacity for reactor property insurance is only $370 million, voluntary practices providing a margin of protection beyond the mandatory minimum may be good business -- consistent with recent proposals on investment-oriented safety goals, and the principles of corporate risk management.