EVOLUTION OF U.S-RUSSIAN COOPERATION IN NUCLEAR MATERIAL PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTING

In a historic turn of events, the early 1990's marked the end of the Cold War and the beginning of a new era of cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation. Democratic elections were held in Russia, land and industry were privatized, and fledgling capitalistic initiatives began to take root. U.S. industry was exploring the potential for joint ventures, and governmental ties became more formally established through regular Summit Meetings between the U.S. and Russian Presidents. Notably, arms control treaties were signed and considered for expansion. In 1991, the Soviet Threat Reduction Act was passed by the U.S. Congress. This legislative measure gave birth to discussions between the two nuclear powers on the safe, secure dismantlement of nuclear weapons and nonproliferation issues. Cooperation in nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) between the U.S. and Russia was a small pan of this original effort. Also, due to the enormous changes in Russian society, the protection systems which had been historically utilized at Russian facilities no longer addressed the threat to those locations. Recognizing that the Russian government has ultimate responsibility for nuclear materials in their country, the U.S. made a commitment to support the improvement of these systems through technical assistance, funding, technology transfer, and experience sharing. Why cooperate in MPC&A? There are many reasons that this is an important area for cooperation and has now become the focus of nuclear cooperation between our two countries. The most obvious reason to work together in the enhancement of MPC&A systems in Russia is to prevent the proliferation of weapons-useable nuclear materials. Vast-stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, lacking adequate protection, control, and accounting, could be susceptible to diversion, theft, or sabotage, especially in light of the recent turbulent political and economic situations in Russia. When salaries become irregular, food hard to find, and basic necessities inaccessible, the most loyal person could decide to utilize any resource available, including profiting from special nuclear materials.