EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS IN SMALL MODULAR REACTORS: A MULTI-PATH APPROACH

Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) represent a pivotal advancement in nuclear energy, offering modular designs and flexible deployment options. However, these features also introduce unique security challenges for physical protection systems (PPS), necessitating tailored approaches to ensure effective threat mitigation. This study presents a Monte Carlo-based multi-path framework, leveraging the Estimate Adversary Sequence Interruption (EASI) model, to evaluate the effectiveness of PPS in SMRs. The model incorporates stochastic sampling of detection probabilities (PD) and dynamic positioning of critical detection points (CDP) to simulate diverse adversary strategies, including random, covert, rushing, and deep penetration approaches. By examining adversary decision-making processes and potential vulnerabilities specific to modular reactor layouts, the framework provides actionable insights for optimizing PPS configurations. Preliminary results highlight the critical importance of adaptive PPS designs that account for the dynamic nature of adversary tactics and the unique structural characteristics of SMRs. This research contributes to the ongoing development of robust security frameworks for next-generation nuclear reactors, emphasizing the integration of advanced modeling techniques to address evolving threats.