EFFECTIVENESS OF SAFEGUARDS IN A CENTRIFUGE ENRICHMENT PLANT

Year
1990
Author(s)
Hideo Nishimura - Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute
T. Okamoto - Tokai University
Abstract
The HEXAPARTITE project concluded that a limited frequency unannounced access (LFUA) inspection should be carried out as a basic safeguards approach in a centrifuge type enrichment plant already in existence, under construction, or firmly planned at that time. Application of this approach to a large scale, future commercial enrichment plant, however, should be fully investigated because the plant will have a larger capability of enriching uranium 235 and have more sensitive information from the commercial and non-proliferation viewpoints. A methodology for safeguards design and evaluation was developed. According to this methodology, firstly a mathematical model for the enriching process was established and computerized on the basis of published documents. Using this centrifuge cascade simulation codes, operations not related to the HEU production were analyzed to avoid false alarms, and theoretically possible scenarios for producing uranium with a higher enrichment were analyzed using a model centrifuge enrichment plant. Then the major anomalies were indicated and the LFUA approach was examined for the plant.