Year
1972
Abstract
afeguards has been defined as \"a collective term that comprises those measures used to guard against the diversion of material such as source and special nuclear material from uses permitted by law or treaty, and to give timely indication of possible diversion or credible assurance that no diversion has occurred\" [1]. One essential safeguards tool is nuclear materials accountability, defined as \"that part of safeguards and materials management which encompasses the measurement system and records and reports to account for source and special nuclear material to minimize the possibility of diversion and to detect diversion promptly should it occur \" [1]. It is clear from these definitions that although accountability is not safeguards, it nevertheless is a safeguards tool which is of utmost importance because it is fhe means whereby one is provided the 'credible assurance that no diversion has occurred1. VJith an ineffective accountability system, this assurance is not provided, and no reasonable amount of physical security measures taken to prevent diversion will be convincing. Key words in the definition of accountability are \"measurements\", \"records\", and \"reports\". These terms all involve data, either from point of view of the'r origin, their processing, or their analysis. Of course, the basic data as they originate must be of sufficiently high intensity and quality to meet the demands of safeguards, but although this is in itself a necessary condition for effective safeguards, it is not sufficient. Inherent in an effective accountability system is the need to process and analyze the data, maintain the records, and initiate the reports, in an efficient manner, where efficiency includes the important concepts of timeliness, and the preservation of data integrity. This paper summarizes the Jersey Nuclear experience in working towards an effective computer-based nuclear materials accountability system.