DETERRING NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL MATERIAL THEFT, SABOTAGE, OR
ILLICIT TRAFFICKING

Although deterrence is a foundational aspect of defense strategies, recent threats of the use of nuclear or radiological weapons have cast a new light on its meaning. Distinctly different from compellence, deterrence places the autonomy of decision on the potential aggressor. In the case of deterrence, potential aggressors are not directly forced to restrain themselves from attacking, instead, they decide that it is in their best interest to self-restrain based on the nature of the environment that they find themselves in. However, the recognized vulnerability of deterrence is that it relies heavily on understanding an adversary’s value and risk metrics. Advances in decision science and human behavior analytics have enriched our understanding of motivations and reasons for decisions beyond rational choice theory. In addition, changes in environment can also alter motivations for action. For example, ‘rational’ cost benefit analysis is significantly different for decision-makers during wartime versus peacetime. Specifically analyzing nuclear and radiological security during wartime, this paper will incorporate recent developments in decision science and deterrence theory, in addition to real-world case studies, to identify predicted vulnerabilities in reliance on deterrence in these situations.