DELAY SYSTEMS IN DOE

The Office of Security Evaluations (OSE) reported at the 1988 INMM Conference that is was undertaking an evaluation of delay systems in the high threat environment for the Department of Energy (DOE). The results of that evaluation were published in October 1988; the report \"An Evaluation of Delay Systems in DOE\" is summarized in this paper. The evaluation focused on delay system policy and guidance, and the implementation of delay systems in the Field. Considerable attention was paid to the application of delay concepts in performing vulnerability analysis during the development of Master Safeguards and Security Agreements (MSSA), and the potential for cost savings and protection program improvements that might result from application of advanced delay technology. In the evaluation, the key concepts of delay systems used were: (1) an individual barrier element should address considerations in all dimensions (i.e. over, under, around, through); (2) effectiveness of a barrier is measured in all modes of facility operation (e.g., access, secure, day, night, fixed, transit, etc., and all possible combinations) ; and (3) a barrier has multi-functional purposes, all of which may not be used in each specific application. Much of the data analysis was accomplished by assessing the concepts of delay used in DOE policy, guidance,and procedures, and in protection program analysis and planning throughout DOE against the concepts that constitute the definition. Specifications for barrier elements widely used in DOE today were analyzed to determine whether they are thorough, current, and accurate. Evaluation data were collected from DOE policy and guidance documents, survey reports, safeguards and security plans (including MSSAs), research documents, Inspection and Evaluations Reports, and various other sources of Field data. Both data collection and analysis were aided by models of various design, analysis, and communication processes that were developed and validated during this evaluation. The evaluation resulted in ten major findings which were presented for use by DOE managers in improving safeguards and security programs. Key findings were: * Significant cost savings in safeguards and security programs may be realized by implementing well-designed barrier systems. * Delay systems engineering may be improved across DOE. * Specific design basis information for barriers is needed to enhance the validity of protection plans, delay system design, and vulnerability analyses. * Critical review of delay assumptions should be developed by DOE and implemented by the Field and HQ.