Correlating Countries’ Commitment to Non-Proliferation with their Level of Strategic Trade Control System

Year
2022
Author(s)
David Albright - Institute for Science and International Security
Sarah Burkhard - Institute for Science and International Security
Spencer Faragasso - Institute for Science and International Security
Linda Keenan - Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract
Using results from the 2021/2022 edition of the Peddling Peril Index, a ranking of 200 countries’ strategic trade controls with a focus on implementation and enforcement, subsets of countries are evaluated based on elements of need for strategic trade controls, commitment to non-proliferation, and opposition to traditional non-proliferation regimes. One evaluated group of countries includes those that have publicly proposed, planned, or started the construction of their first nuclear power plant. Often overlooked by these countries is the need for robust export controls that protect newly gained nuclear know-how, designs, technology, and materials from unauthorized transfers or exports. Mature export control systems are even more important in countries that desire to first import nuclear power reactors and related equipment as a prelude to becoming an international nuclear supplier, or as part of a largely indigenous nuclear fuel cycle. A second group is composed of countries that are members of the Non-Alignment Movement and as such oppose traditional non-proliferation regimes. Here, the concern is that the opposition has a negative impact on the country’s ability to systematically prevent illicit trade in strategic commodities. A third group of countries includes those that have signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which sidelines verification and contains language implying that nuclear trade should not be controlled or restricted. All three subsets of countries are evaluated by their level of strategic trade controls based on the countries’ ranks in the Peddling Peril Index, followed by the identification of specific gaps in the countries’ trade control systems.