Connecting The Pillars Of The Npt: Enabling Multilateral Disarmament Verification While Respecting Nonproliferation Obligations

Historically, relatively little analysis has been published about how nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) are expected to implement their legal obligations under NPT Articles I and II. This issue is immediately relevant to the international debate over nuclear disarmament, specifically to what information must be protected versus what can be shared in order to enable a process for disarmament verification involving NNWS. Of course, proliferation sensitive information must be protected throughout any verification process, whether or not a NNWS or international verification body participates. However, different NWS and NNWS interpret their legal obligations differently, as reflected in both political positions on the potential role of NNWS in verification and in the rules on classification of nuclear weapons-related information. Some NWS participants have stated that Article I limits what they could show or share. Similarly, some NNWS participants argue that their obligations under Article II limit their potential contribution to verification efforts. This paper explores these questions and discusses how nonproliferation and disarmament efforts can be reinforcing and not contradictory, especially regarding verification.