COMPARISON OF NDA AND DA MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUES FOR EXCESS PLUTONIUM POWDERS AT THE HANFORD SITE: STATISTICAL DESIGN AND HETEROGENEITY TESTING

Quantitative physical measurements are a necessary component of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear material safeguards verification regime. In December 1994, IAEA safeguards were initiated on an inventory of excess plutonium powder items at the Plutonium Finishing Plant, Vault 3, on the U.S. Department of Energy's Hanford Site. The material originated from the U.S. nuclear weapons complex. The diversity of the chemical form and the heterogenous physical form of this inventory were anticipated to challenge the precision and accuracy of quantitative destructive analytical techniques. A sampling design was used to estimate the degree of heterogeneity of the plutonium content of a variety of inventory items. Plutonium concentration, the item net weight, and the 2