Challenges and solutions in securing Ukrainian borders against trafficking ofradiological and nuclear materials

Year
2019
Author(s)
Vadym Ivko - Administration of State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine
Pavel Tishakov - Nordisk Sikkerhet AS, Baerums Verk, Norway
Pavel Lebedev - Nordisk Sikkerhet AS, Kyiv, Ukraine
Abstract
Over recent years, Ukraine has undergone significant changes and faced daunting challenges from many different standpoints, including in the area of the detection and interception of illicit radiological and nuclear materials. Together with donor partners from the United States, Norway, and other European countries, Ukraine’s State Border Guard Service (SBGS) is leading the charge in assuring radiological and nuclear security measures at the border of Ukraine meet the highest of standards. The Crimean Peninsula and Eastern Ukraine offer two case studies as to the new realities in radiological and nuclear security facing Ukraine and how the Ukrainian government, including the SBGS, operates within them. With the Crimean Peninsula, such realities are: military build-up on the Peninsula and adjacent waters (including deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles with nuclear capabilities); restoration of old Soviet military nuclear facilities; problems with navigation on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, issues with regulatory control over 200+ radioactive sources and nuclear research reactor in Sevastopol, etc. Simultaneously, the realities in Eastern Ukraine are cause for concern as well: 409 km of uncontrolled land border; frequent exchange of fire; insubordinate regional authorities; presence of radiologically, chemically, and biologically hazardous facilities near the engagement line; almost 1,200 radioactive sources out of regulatory control. SBGS units, together with the Armed Forces and National Guard of Ukraine, are assigned to ensure security at the engagement line and perform inspections at specially designated entry and exit checkpoints (CPEE, 5 in the East and 3 in the Crimean Peninsula). CBRN operations at that CPEE (including radiologic inspection) are conducted using hand-held equipment and lack any stationary equipment, while much attention is paid to the effectiveness of risk profiling and investigation information. ?oncurrently, new solutions are being tested that will ensure a combination of better sensitivity and redeployment capabilities, e.g. deployment of portal monitors mounted on metal platforms with wireless Internet or satellite connection, and other solutions.