Although controls on single use and dual-use technologies (technical data and technical assistance) are deeply embedded in export control regimes, it is notable that nuclear and nuclearrelated technologies are underrepresented in the annexes to the Additional Protocol. Export control regimes recognize the central importance of technologies needed for the development, production, or use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) because technology is critical to the use of controlled goods and the development of indigenous WMD-related production capabilities. A historical, public case study helps to understand the danger posed by trafficking in uranium enrichment gas centrifuge technologies. The specific case involves the extensive assistance, including technical centrifuge data and technical training, provided by a Swiss family to the secret Libyan gas centrifuge program, trafficking critical to Libya’s nuclear weapons program and all but invisible to authorities for many years until Libya decided to abandon its nuclear weapons program under IAEA verification. This assistance in turn depended on extensive technical assistance provided to this family by the Khan network. The information was uncovered and released as part of the successful Swiss Federal prosecution of three members of this family. This case study shows the importance of more fully incorporating technologies into safeguards reporting and awareness. It can also inform proposed modifications to annexes of the Model Additional Protocol.