Case study Application of the IAEA Safeguards Assessment Methodology to a Pressurized water Reactor

BNL/TSO and SAI have prepared a case study illustrating the application of an assessment methodology to an international safeguards system for pressurized light water reactors (PWRs). The study was part of an effort by the IAEA and an international consultants group to develop a methodology for assessing IAEA safeguards effectiveness. The methodology attempts to evaluate the safeguards system's ability to detect diversion. There are three phases in application of the methodology: 1. A design assessment, in which a conceptual design for a PWR safeguards system is evaluated, assuming technology available now or within the next few years, but without addressing the problem of constrained inspection resources. 2. An implementation assessment, which could serve as a blueprint for safeguarding a particular facility in a manner consistent with practical constraints on resources and intrusiveness. 3. A performance evaluation, in which the results of particular inspections are evaluated ^ posteriori. These results were simply hypothesized for the purpose of this study. For an actual facility, the IAEA would employ the results of actual inspections at a given Light Water Reactor (LWR).