Safeguards-By-Design (SBD) proports to contribute to reducing financial costs, human resource needs and shortening timelines for new nuclear reactor builds by incorporating safeguards needs into their design. Canada’s experience implementing the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) equipment-based approach (EBA) for spent fuel loadings and transfers across its fleet of 19 CANDU reactors offers valuable insight into the SBD concept. The EBA process is demonstrating that having the same reactor type does not necessarily translate into a uniform approach to safeguards across each reactor site. Unique differences, such as the age of the reactor, its location and design modifications create disparity in the equipment needs and installation costs at each CANDU site. Advanced and Small Modular Reactors (SMR) are offering a renewed opportunity to pursue and benefit from SBD, not only because they are still in their design phase, but are also anticipated to be deployed rapidly and in a fleet-approach once authorized by regulators. This could eliminate design variations, which can theoretically lead to the application of identical safeguards across each identical SMR constructed. But is rapid and fleet approach deployment possible? One factor that can cause delays is the regulatory process associated with authorizing the construction, operation, and eventual decommissioning of a nuclear reactor. The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), Canada’s nuclear regulator, is undertaking an SMR Readiness strategy which aims to ensure its regulatory framework, technical capacity and workforce is ready to support SMR deployment in Canada. In addition, the CNSC offers a Vendor Design Review (VDR) which is an optional service that permits the CNSC to review designs prior to a formal licensing process. A VDR ensures early consideration of safety, security and safeguards expectations, which will permit vendors to consider incorporating them into their designs prior to licensing. These efforts aim to ensure that the CNSC’s licensing process does not become a barrier to new reactor deployment. Despite this effort, no regulatory licensing process can proceed at a pace which compromises safety and regulatory independence. Moreover, different regulatory practices across different jurisdictions and the greater expectation for consultation with affected stakeholders are factors which may affect the length of regulatory licensing processes. This, in addition to other factors outside of regulatory control, may still affect the rapid, fleet approach deployment that SMR vendors are striving for. These factors merit greater discussions. Forums such as the IAEA’s SBD working groups, dialogue and cooperation between international regulators on SMR regulations, and ongoing and frequent discussion between the IAEA, regulators and SMR proponents/operators will be essential in determining if the future of SMRs will also lead to the success of SBD.
Year
2024
Abstract