Calling Putin’s Bluff (Or Not?)An Assessment of Russian Attachment to the INF Treaty and Its Implications

Year
2019
Author(s)
Christopher D. Jones - University of Washington
Jared Rowe - Middlebury Institute of International Studies
Abstract
Since representatives from the US State Department publicly accused the Russian Federation of violating the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2014, much discussion and debate has taken place about the treaty’s future. Five years on, the points of contention for both parties have not changed. While US officials have reported that the Russian military has tested, and deployed a missile type prohibited by the INF treaty, Russian policymakers have denied these allegations, demanded corroborating evidence of their wrongdoing, and themselves accused the United States of violating the INF Treaty. Even in the final months before the INF treaty’s abrogation, Russian officials have repeatedly made public remarks in support of the document’s survival. This behavior appears to directly contradict their previous threats to withdraw from the treaty. It also stands in the face of a multitude of incentives for the Russians to do so. Why have they not withdrawn? Content analysis of statements from a variety of Russian policymakers, and academics suggests that one can tie Russian retention of the INF Treaty to a desire to achieve two objectives: To use the terms of the treaty to maintain strategic parity with the United States and to uphold Russia’s reputation as an exemplar in the field of international arms control. This suggests that the Russians perceive the INF Treaty as both a guarantor of Russian security vis a vis the US and NATO and a tool through which to promote their interpretation of the moral and practical principles driving the international arms control regime. With this in mind, US policymakers can expect their Russian counterparts to respond to US withdrawal from the INF Treaty in an extremely negative manner that will destabilize Europe, and potentially undermine NATO unity. While it is too late to save the INF Treaty, US officials can mitigate the divisive potency of Russian rhetoric by sharing more information about Russia’s violation, or making concessions with European partners that offset the Kremlin's message.