The IAEA Safeguards Department developed sophisticated tools over the past two decades to help the inspectorate obtain better and deeper understanding of the nuclear fuel cycle. Specifically, the IAEA needs to understand the issues of proliferation threats of various nuclear material combinations and nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Hence, the IAEA developed the Physical Model of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle as a valuable tool giving a State Evaluation Group a resource to evaluate the fuel cycle capabilities of a State. With this knowledge they could distribute safeguards resources over the State using data and analysis. However, the Safeguards Department can also benefit from the understanding of the concept of proliferation resistance as described by GIF/PR&PPWG efforts as well as the upcoming updated INPRO proliferation resistance manual. Proliferation resistance is that characteristic of a nuclear energy system that impedes the diversion or undeclared production of nuclear material, or misuse of technology, by States to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. What can benefit Safeguards practitioners is the understanding that the degree of proliferation resistance results from a combination of, inter alia, technical design features, operational modalities, institutional arrangements, and safeguards measures. They should gain valuable understanding of deeper analysis of nuclear material choices, operations and the institutions in a State governing nuclear power and development. By gazing beyond the boundaries of safeguards they will broaden their scope of nuclear fuel cycle understanding which should benefit making prudent choices of safeguards analyses and approaches as well as the distribution of technical and human resources.
Year
2024
Abstract