Authentication of an Operator-provided Containment and Surveillance (C&S) System

Large multicomponent Operator—provided C&S systems with computer control, such as the pioneering Japanese Fast Critical Assembly Portal Monitor (FCA P/M), can efficiently meet evolving IAEA C&S requirements but they present substantial challenges to the IAEA's need to authenticate the data produced. To authenticate such systems by traditional IAEA methods would require a prohibitive expenditure of resources to ensure that each individual component is provided with credible tamper indication and that the control and interpretation of the data is appropriate. Consequently, in parallel with the FCA P/M field trial currently underway in Japan, the IAEA has initiated a programme aimed at producing resource-efficient and credible authentication of the system. Although initially focussed on the P/M system, the methods under consideration are applicable to other similar Operatorprovided systems. The methods include physical examination of the installation, software checking, authentication of the video record, independent recording with Agency equipment of sensor contact actuation, and active authentication by random actuation of the Operator-provided field sensors. Some of the features and problems of each are discussed, with particular emphasis on active authentication because of its ability in itself to check the entire system. Key assumptions and parameters of the authentication problem are also stated.