ASSESSING THE INTEGRITY OF LOCAL AREA NETWORK MATERIALS ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEMS AGAINST INSIDER THREATS

Year
1996
Author(s)
E.D. Jones - Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Alan Sicherman - Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Abstract
DOE fadities rely increasinglyon computerizedsystems to managenuclear materials accountabilitydata and to protect against diversion of nuclear mterids or other malevolentacts (e.g., hoax due to f~i data) by insider threats. Aspectsof modem computerizedmaterial accountability@fA)SyStOIIMindudillg pOWOrfId personalComputcmand appbtkm on networks mixed aecmity environmmts, and more users with increasedhwwledge, skills and abilities help heighten the concern about insidcrthreats tothe integrity of the system. In this paper, we dmcribc a methoddogy fa asaemingMAapplicationsto help decision makezsMentifywaysof and compare O@OIMfor Preheating of mi- possible additiondrisks tkomtheinsider threat. We illustrate insights from applying the mdddogy to local areanetworkmwerids accountabilitysystems