All at Sea? A Safeguards Approach for the Military Naval Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Brazil’s nuclear submarine program presents a new challenge for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards regime. The standard safeguards agreements be- tween non-nuclear-weapon states and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) allow member states to remove from safeguards nuclear materials to be used in non-proscribed mili- tary activities, including naval nuclear propulsion. Until now, no non-weapon state has sought to exercise this option. There is concern that the special constraints on inspector access and continuity of knowledge imposed by a military environment and by naval fuel could limit the ability of the IAEA to detect in a timely way that nuclear materials are not diverted to weapons purposes. In this paper, we propose a model for the implementation of safeguards in the mili- tary naval nuclear fuel cycle. While the viability of the concept is examined in the context of the Brazilian submarine program, the general approach also may be relevant for safeguarding the naval fuel cycle in nuclear weapon states under a future Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Most of the current nuclear-powered vessels are deployed by weapon states and fu- eled with highly enriched uranium and an FMCT will need to provide assurance that highly enriched uranium intended for military naval propulsion is not diverted for weapons.