Adequacy of IAEA Safeguards in JCPOA to Verify the Peacefulness of Iran's Nuclear Program

Year
2024
Author(s)
Yanuar Ady Setiawan - Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology (UNIST)
Abstract
Before 1979, Iran was once Western’s partner in expanding the benefits of nuclear power in middle east as Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi - who was the head of Imperial State of Iran - saw nuclear technology as a key for Iranian modernization in developing Iranian strength and independence. The Shah successfully brought Western support in establishing necessary facility and obtaining nuclear materials as Iran embarked on their nuclear power programme. However, the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran - along with their policy, incidents, and conflicts - made the Western left their nuclear partnership with Iran, unfinished and abandoned. Isolated and pressured by most of nuclear power countries, Iran had to being discreet and not fully transparent in developing their nuclear programme. Iran turned to China, Russia (was Soviet Union), and even the “nuclear black market” to obtain the necessary technology and materials, especially for nuclear fuel cycle programme. The 2000s revelation of Iran’s enrichment facility at Natanz and Fordow along with Iran’s intention to build a heavy water research reactor breed a suspicion that Iran had been (and/or maybe still is) trying to acquire nuclear weapons (uranium-based and/or plutonium-based) which potentially could bring more instability to the region, and eventually the rest of the world. Years of diplomacy resulted in Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015 which gives three layers of verification system to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in safeguarding nuclear materials in Iran. This paper summarizes the history of Iran’s nuclear power programme along with the profile of its key nuclear facilities which might be used as Iran’s pathway to obtain necessary weapons-grade nuclear materials for their nuclear weapon. This paper also discusses of how or whether IAEA safeguards under JCPOA is adequate to “block” Iran’s uranium-pathway and plutonium-pathway to acquire nuclear weapons, thus kept Iran adhere to their obligation as Non-Nuclear-Weapon State (NNWS) under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon (NPT).