Anita Nilsson Director Office of Nuclear Security, IAEA

PLENARY SESSION PATRAM 2010 7 October 2010, London



Nuclear Security








Prevention


Detection

Response

- Theft of nuclear weapon
- Theft of material to make improvised nuclear explosive device
- Theft of radioactive material for radiological dispersal device
- Sabotage of facility or transport







International Atomic Energy Agency



International Instruments

Legally binding:

- Convention on the **Physical Protection of** Nuclear Material & Amendment
- Safeguards agreements and additional protocols
- Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism
- Security Council resolution 1540
- Security Council resolution 1373

Non-binding: Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of **Radioactive Sources**

> Amendment to the Convention **Physical Protection of Nuclear**

> IAEA International Law Series No. 2





Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

CODE OF CONDUCT ON THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF **RADIOACTIVE SOURCES**

放射源安全和保安行为准则

CODE DE CONDUITE SUR LA SÛRETÉ ET LA SÉCURITÉ DES SOURCES RADIOACTIVES

КОДЕКС ПОВЕДЕНИЯ ПО ОБЕСПЕЧЕНИЮ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ И СОХРАННОСТИ РАДИОАКТИВНЫХ источников

CÓDIGO DE CONDUCTA SOBRE SEGURIDAD TECNOLÓGICA Y FÍSICA DE LAS FUENTES RADIACTIVAS

> مدونة قواعد السلوك بشأن أمان المصادر المشعة وأمنها





Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)

Protection of Nuclear Material:

Export and Import Requirements:

 States are not to undertake transports/transits unless NM protected at appropriate levels

Identification of Offences Article 7 requires penalties under National Law



Responsibility for Nuclear Security

The responsibility for nuclear security rests entirely with individual States.





Nuclear Security Plan 2010-2013



Contribute to effective nuclear security through assistance in capacity building, guidance, human resource development, sustainability and risk reduction. Contribute to global efforts to achieve worldwide, effective security wherever nuclear or other radioactive material is in *use, storage and/or transport*, and of associated facilities, by supporting States, upon request, in their efforts to establish and maintain



Nuclear Security Guidance

IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 3

Technical Guidance Reference Manual

Monitoring for Radioactive Material in International Mail Transported by Public Postal Operators

ointly sponsored by the

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Nuclear Security Series



Recommendations

Implementing Guides

Final stage of development



Fundamentals

The purpose of the *Fundamentals* is to provide the objective and essential elements necessary for a State's *nuclear* security regime.

Bringing together implementation of relevant nuclear security legal instruments



Recommendations

There are three different Recommendations document:

- Physical protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (also INFCIRC/225. Rev. 5)
- Recommendations on Security of Radioactive Material and Associated facilities
- Recommendations on Security of Radioactive Material outside of Regulatory Control

The two first documents contain separate recommendations chapters for transport security.



Recommendations on radioactive material and associated facilities

- The threshold values for high consequence <u>class 7</u> <u>material is set to 10D for radionuclides</u> listed in the Code of Conduct and 3000A₂ for all other nuclides
- The <u>new threshold values has been communicated</u> to the UN Sub-Committee of Experts and will be included in the next revision of the Model regulations





Transport Security Group Levels

Two security levels are recommended

Incremental Transport Security Measures

Enhanced Security Levels
Radioactivity
Threshold
Basic Security Levels
Excepted
Packages
LSA-I
SCO-I
Prudent Management Practices

Increasing Radioactivity

*

AEA

Excepted packages with activity not exceeding the level permitted for the radionuclide when it is not in special form Some small risk shipments fall below the lesser of the two levels of security

> For radioactive materials posing a minimal threat, only prudent management practices are necessary

Security Requirements for Nuclear Material of Category I and II

- Advance *notification* to the receiver of the planned shipment
- Prior authorization by the competent authority after a security survey
- Transport security plan
- Selection of *transport mode* and *routing*:
- Provision of *locks and seals* and their checks before dispatch
- Search of the load vehicle for sabotage devices prior to loading
- Written instructions to transport personnel
- Transport control centre for the continuous monitoring of vehicle
- Requirements on communications, guards, emergency actions and transfer of responsibilities



Requirements related to the mode of transport

- <u>Shipment by road</u>: designated and specially designed load vehicles, guards to each load vehicle, guarded parking, *transport control centre*

- <u>Shipment by rail:</u> freight train and exclusive use wagon, guards, travelling in the nearest carriage

- <u>Sea transportation</u>: dedicated ship, secure compartment or container, <u>locked and sealed</u>

- <u>Air transportation:</u> designated aircraft, NM as its sole cargo







Security training of transport personnel

Security awareness training :

- Nature of security threats and concerns
- Actions to be taken in case of an incident
- Responsibilities for implementation of security plans

Records of all security training should be kept by the employer.







Specifics of ground transportation

- Challenges of public domain on the transportation route
 - Traffic uncertainties
 - Public can very closely approach vehicle—no stand off distance
 - Need to stop for fuel, subsistence
- An attack can occur anywhere along the route (up to thousands km)
 - Potential attack locations- difficult for arrival of secondary response
- Access to moving nuclear transport would be difficult/impossible
 - Adversary scenario must include stopping transport








Confirmed incidents 1993-2009

1784 incidents reported during 1993-2009





IAEA Transport Security Assistance Program

- Expert advisory missions to provide advice and guidance
- Training courses for regulatory, governmental and industry personnel
 - Transport security awareness
 - Detailed training on designing and implementing transport security programs
- Identification and prioritization of needs (developing security approaches and plans)
- Development model security plans and procedures
- Equipment* (vehicles, packages, command and control equipment, etc.)



Conclusion

- CPPNM and its amendments, other international instruments and IAEA guidance provide clear obligations and indication on the need to secure transportation of nuclear and other radioactive materials
- Security elements

<u>detection</u> - convoy observation or interior intrusion devices <u>delay</u>- building a vault-type enclosure on the nuclear cargo/ truck <u>response</u> – planning and preparations

- scenario analysis and feed back
- Considerations and graded approach security should always be part of normal transport preparations



For further information please visit our website

http://www-ns.iaea.org/security/

