Sabotage Evaluation Process

Year
1992
Author(s)
Neil R. Zack - Los Alamos National Laboratory
H. R. Martin - U. S. Department of Energy
Abstract
Recently developed guidance concerning protection against sabotage at DOE facilities dictates that a structured process be employed to evaluate possible sabotage vulnerabilities. Sabotage should be recognized as only one class of a number of events that can cause dispersal of hazardous materials from a facility, and it should be treated as one component of the overall assessment of risks associated with inventories of hazardous materials. In this context, a mechanism must be provided for representation by all facility functions that would be involved, i.e., operations, safety emergency preparedness, safeguards and security, etc. A sequence for assessing and addressing sabotage risks should establish a multi-discipline team to perform the evaluation( s), identify and assess quantities of hazardous materials at the facility, identify and rank hazardous material targets, perform a vulnerability assessment of credible threat targets, evaluate sabotage risk reduction options, and validate and test sabotage protection programs. This paper will expand upon and discuss each of these suggested steps in the sabotage evaluation process.