TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION OF A DIFFERENT NATURE: APPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS TECHNOLOGY TO THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS VERIFICATION REGIME”

Year
1996
Author(s)
Ann Reisman - Brookhaven National Laboratory
Steven P. Kadner - Aquila Technologies Group Inc.
Elizabeth Turpen - Aquila Technologies Group Inc.
Abstract
The following discussion focuses on the issue of arms control implementation from the standpoint of technology and technical resistance. Not only are the procedures and techniques for safeguarding nuclear materials undergoing substantial changes, but the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) will give rise to technical difficulties unprecedented in the implementation of arms control verification. Although these regimes present new challenges, an analysis of the similarities between the nuclear and chemical weapons non-proliferation verification regimes illustrates the overlap in technological solutions. Just as cost-effective and efficient technologies can solve the problems faced by the nuclear safeguards community, these same technologies offer solutions for the CWC verification regime. With this in mind, experts at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), who are responsible for verification implementation, need to devise a CWC verification protocol that considers the technology already available. The functional similarity of IAEA and the OPCW, in conjunction with the technical necessities of both verification regimes, should receive attention with respect to the establishment of a technical assistance program. Lastly, the advanced status of the nuclear and chemical regime vis-&vis the biological non-proliferation regime can inform our approach to implementation of confidence building measures for biological weapons.