Challenges and Opportunities for 3S by Design for Transportation and Packaging for Advanced Reactor Nuclear Fuel Cycle

The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) tracks 42 small modular reactors (SMRs) in 13 countries and has assessed their progress toward commercialization and deployment. Safe, secure, and safeguarded SMRs and fuels are essential for international commercialization. SMRs and advanced reactors currently with lower levels of technology and with licensing readiness could be deployed at scale by the 2030s. Some of these technologies aim to close the back end of the fuel cycle by reprocessing and recycling spent nuclear fuel. These technologies span an enormous range of reactor concepts (e.g., water-cooled, gas-cooled, fast spectrum, micro, and molten salt) and configurations (e.g., land-based, multi-module, marine-based, and mobile) and the entire fuel cycle. This range creates a multitude of challenges and opportunities for safety, security, and safeguards (3S) by design in the lifecycle for the transportation and packaging of un-irradiated and irradiated fuel --- in particular, throughout the entire nuclear fuel cycle, in which transportation is widely recognized as the most vulnerable link.Safety routinely has been the first of 3S disciplines to be considered for nuclear transportation and packaging. However, the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database shows that thefts during transportation of nuclear material in the last decade reached 14% of all reported incidents, highlighting the added importance of strengthening transport security measures. In comparison, safeguards awareness is a relatively new priority; nuclear facilities in States under international agreements must meet international legal obligations. The U.S. NRC 3S virtual workshop in December 2023 broadly noted that consideration of 3S at the early stage of design was important for identifying synergies and conflicts, but U.S. vendors are often unaware of safeguards requirements. Nonetheless, obligations for safety, security, and safeguards need to be met worldwide. Based on our previous work on conflicts and synergies with international packaging and transport Safety, Security, and Safeguards [1] and culture analysis for international nuclear transport [2], this paper describes the basic principle useful for determining synergies and conflicts that is applicable to each of the 3S disciplines from design to operation throughout the nuclear fuel cycle. The methodology underlying this principle addresses the degree of access to nuclear material and to nuclear information that is either required or prohibited by national and international requirements. Based on this principle and methodology, this paper also identifies challenges and recommends opportunities for identifying 3S synergies and conflicts for nuclear transport and packaging to help reduce design and operating costs and to avoid costly retrofitting, particularly in the United States, where vendors and transporters may be less familiar with international safeguards under the U.S./IAEA Voluntary Safeguards Offer Agreement.References:1. R.B. Pope et al., An Overview of a Comprehensive Assessment of the International Interactions and Interfaces for Packaging and Transport Safety, Security, and Safeguards (the 3Ss) --- Identifying Conflicts and Synergies, Journal of Nuclear Materials Management, 2022 Volume XLIX No. 4.2. K.E. Sanders et al., “Culture Analysis for International Nuclear Transport,” PATRAM 2022, Juan-les-Pins, Antibes, French Riviera, June 11-15, 2023.