SYSTEMS ENGINEERING FOR INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS

Anticipated changes to traditional civilian nuclear markets—namely those stemming from advanced and small modular reactors (A/SMR)—will introduce new and novel challenges to the international safeguards regime. More specifically, some experts have described how new nuclear fuels, fuel cycles and spent fuel management systems will challenge the ability for timely and effective safeguards verification for A/SMRs. Traditionally, safeguards solutions have been developed by domain experts in nuclear material measurements, physical and electrical containment, electrical surveillance and area/environmental radiological signal monitoring. Yet, the uncertainty (and complexity) of achieving comparable levels of safeguards success with the anticipated challenges related to A/SMR deployment suggest the need for additional areas of technical expertise. Systems engineering, defined as “a transdisciplinary and integrative approach to enable the successful realization, use, and retirement of engineered systems, using systems principles and concepts, and scientific, technological, and management methods” by the International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) seemingly provides the logical and technical acumen to address these challenges to international nuclear safeguards. Building on recent discussions with international safeguards experts, this concept paper seeks to explore the efficacy of visualizing international nuclear safeguards through a systems engineering lens, which includes (but is not limited to): describing traditional nuclear safeguards in terms of emergent behaviors, reconceptualizing traditional nuclear safeguards objectives as functional requirements and addressing key points of interdependence within traditional nuclear safeguards approaches. The result is a notional systems engineering-based framework for international nuclear safeguards aimed to mitigate a representative set of the previously described challenges. After summarizing today’s international nuclear safeguards regime and describing forecast challenges from A/SMR deployment, this paper will introduce INCOSE-defined elements of systems engineering. Building on this systems engineering perspective for international safeguards, this paper will then explain how such a framing of nuclear safeguards can mitigate anticipated near-term challenges. Lastly, this paper will discuss conclusions and insights for the adequacy of systems engineering to improve international nuclear safeguards, as well as implications for next steps toward furthering this exploration and for inclusion in “3S-by-design” approaches.