Technology Diffusion of a Different Nature: Applications of Nuclear Safeguards Technology to the Chemical Weapons Verification Regime

The following discussion focuses on the issue of arms-control implementation from the standpoint of technology and technical assistance. Not only are the procedures and techniques for safeguarding nuclear materials undergoing substantial changes, but implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention will give rise to technical difficulties unprecedented in arms-control verification. Although these regimes present new challenges, an analysis of the similarities between the nuclear-and chemical-weapons nonproliferation verification regimes illustrates the overlap in organizational structures and technological solutions. Just as costeffective and efficient technologies can solve the problems faced by the nuclear safeguards community, these same technologies offer solutions for the CWC verification regime. Experts at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), who are responsible for verification implementation, need to devise a CWC verification protocol that takes into account the technology already available. The functional similarity of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the OPCW, in conjunction with the technical necessities of both verification regimes, should receive attention with respect to the establishment of the national authority and a technical assistance program. Moreover, the advanced status of the nuclear and chemical regime vis-a-vis the biological nonproliferation regime can inform our approach to implementation of confidence-building measures for biological weapons.