US/RUSSIAN AFFIRMATION PROCESS OF THE RUSSIAN FISSILE MATERIAL CONTAINER DESIGN

Year
1998
Author(s)
R. E. Glass - Sandia National Laboratories, USA
S.M. Nunley - US Department of Energy
G. Chalfant - SAIC, USA
File Attachment
47.PDF1.52 MB
Abstract
The United States government agreed to provide the Russian Federation with containers to support the dismantlement ofRussian nuclear weapons as part ofthe Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program. In February 1996, the \"affinnation\" ofthe Russian Fissile Material container design was completed. The \"affirmation\" process allowed a joint program between the Russian and US governments to proceed without the exchange of sensitive weapons specific information. The Russian Fissile Material container program is an integral part o f the Cooperative Threat Reduction program wherein the US government provides assistance to the states ofthe Former Soviet Union for dismantlement oftheir nuclear stockpile. The Cooperative Threat Reduction program is managed by the US Defense Special Weapons Agency. Sandia National Laboratories was selected as the design agency and technical point o f contact for the Russian Federation. The Department of Energy, which certifies containers for weapons shipments in the United States, provided an independent assessment o f the Sandia designed container to assure that it met the requirements of the August 31, 1993 AI-400R Container RCQuirements [Sandia National Laboratories, 1993) document which was agreed to by representatives ofthe United States and Russian Federation. The \"affirmation\" process was undertaken in lieu of a certification process. This process was a formal review by the US Department o f Energy o f Sandia' s design and testing o f the Russian Fissile Material container. The affirmation was intended to provide the Russian Federation with assurance that the container met the negotiated requirements including specific sections of IAEA Safety Series 6 (IAEA,1985). The process stopped short of a certification process that would have required weapons specific design information. It is the responsibility o f the Russian Federation to use the information derived during the affirmation process, as well as internal resources, to obtain certification.