Year
1988
Abstract
The design and construction of supersensitive facilities and the installation of systems secure from technical surveillance and sabotage penetration involve \"TSCM\" in the broad sense of technical \"security\" countermeasures. When the technical threat was at a lower level of intensity and sophistication, it was common practice to defer TSCM to the future facility occupant. However, the New Moscow Embassy experience has proven this course of action subject to peril. Although primary concern with the embassy was audio surveillance, elsewhere there are other threats of equal or greater concern, e.g., technical implants may be used to monitor readiness status or interfere with the operation of C3I and weapons systems. Present and future technical penetration threats stretch the imagination. The Soviets have committed substantial hard scientific resources to a broad range of technical intelligence, even including applications of parapsychology. Countering these threats requires acceptance that the problem involves protection against technologies and applications we may not fully understand. It certainly involves continuous TSCM precautions from initial planning to completion. Designs and construction/installation techniques must facilitate technical inspections and preclude the broadest range of known and suspected technical penetration efforts.