MODELING RISK ASSESSMENT FOR NUCLEAR PROCESSING PLANTS WITH LAVA

Year
1988
Author(s)
Suzanne T. Smith - Los Alamos National Laboratory
Richard M. Tisinger - Los Alamos National Laboratory
Abstract
Using the Los Alamos Vulnerability and Risk Assessment (LAVA) methodology, we developed a model for assessing risks associated with nuclear processing plants. LAVA is a three-part systematic approach to risk assessment. The first part is the mathematical methodology; the second is the general personal computer-based software engine; and the third is the application itself. The methodology provides a framework for creating applications for the software engine to operate upon; all application-specific information is data. Using LAVA, we build knowledge-based expert systems to assess risks in applications systems comprising a subject system and a safeguards system. The subject system model is sets of threats, assets, and undesirable outcomes. The safeguards system model is sets of safeguards functions for protecting the assets from the threats by preventing or ameliorating the undesirable outcomes, sets of safeguards subfunctions whose performance determine whether the function is adequate and complete, and sets of issues, appearing as interactive questionnaires, whose measures (in both monetary and linguistic terms) define both the weaknesses in the safeguards system and the potential costs of an undesirable outcome occurring. LAVA applications include our computer security application and applications for embedded systems, survivability systems, transborder data flow systems, property control systems, and others.