Safeguards on Nuclear Waste

Safeguards and security policies within the Department of Energy (DOE) have been implemented in a graded fashion for the protection, control and accountability of nuclear materials. This graded philosophy has meant that safeguards on low-equity nuclear materials, typically considered of low diversion attractiveness such as waste, has been relegated to minimal controls. This philosophy has been and remains today an acceptable approach for the planning and implementation of safeguards on this material. Nuclear waste protection policy and guidance have been issued (Ref. 1 and 2) due to a lack of clear policy and guidance on the identification and implementation of safeguards controls on waste. However, there are issues related to safe-guarding waste that need to be clarified. These issues primarily stem from increased budgetary and resource pressures to remove materials from safeguards. There are other issues regarding the responsibilities for safeguarding nuclear waste once under the cognizance of waste management organizations. Finally, there may be an unclear understanding as to the scope and content of vulnerability (or risk) assessments required prior to terminating safeguards on waste and other discardable materials and where the authority should lie within the Department for making decisions regarding safeguards termination. This paper examines these issues and the technical basis for Departmental policy for terminating safeguards on waste. This technical basis will be compared to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This comparison is significant since nuclear waste at Departmental facilities generated through processing of nuclear material under IAEA safeguards would be subject to IAEA verification and other safeguards requirements.