Material Control and Accountability Excess Fissile Material Disposition

Year
1995
Author(s)
Sharon A. Snowden - Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Abstract
The surplus fissile materials control and disposition project will present new concerns for safeguarding the surplus special nuclear material. Current methods of material control and accountability as well as physical security will be challenged. The challenges for safeguards will occur in whatever immobilization medium is used; i.e., ceramic, glass or Deep Borehole. If DOE Order 5633.3B is the controlling MC&A order, verification/confirmation measurements and the acceptance of these measurements must be done on large amounts of material in a very short time frame. Furthermore, if the excess material is to be spiked with fission product like 137 cs, MC&A measurements after spiking need to be well thought out. A methodology and an agreement of what constitutes a valid measurement may need to be agreed to before processing starts. Safeguards concerns relating to immobilization must be considered in parallel with other concerns like criticality, plant design, and decommissioning. A project of this magnitude produces challenges for Material Control and Accountability, as well as physical security.