Year
1982
Abstract
This paper summarizes the methodology developed for a sabotage analysis (Reference 1) carried out by International Energy Associates Limited (IEAL) for Sandia National Laboratories in support of the Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS). The purpose of the analysis was to establish the technical basis for sabotage protection at DOE facilities. The ideal sabotage protection strategy would define requirements for assessing sabotage protection needs on a systematically derived technical basis that incorporates facility-unique characteristics with the broad range of OSS responsibilities. These responsibilities include protecting the national security and public and occupational health and safety integrity of DOE operations as primary considerations while considering the economic, environmental, and political- social consequences of sabotage. The primary objective of this analysis, which is one of several sabotage protection efforts supported by OSS at Sandia, is to provide a mechanism for identifying the most important DOE facilities in terms of the sabotage protection levels required. In meeting this primary objective, the analysis also identified the least important facilities, as well as those in between, thereby providing a systematically derived ranking of DOE facilities according to sabotage consequence risks.