CAR BOMB PROTECTION

NRC recently changed the security rules for its licensed fuel facilities and power reactors. The fuel facilities must conform with DOE requirements which include vehicles in the design basis threat for nuclear theft. The design basis threat for radiological sabotage has not been changed, but the power reactors must plan for what they would do to defend against a vehicle carrying a large amount of explosives. To defend against a saboteurs' or a thieves' vehicle would require different considerations for a vehicle barrier: one that would prevent the saboteurs' vehicle from entering the safe stand-off distance from a vital area, the other would just prevent a thieves' vehicle from entering or leaving the protected area. By planning now to defend against both threats, facilities may avoid a second vehicle barrier in the future. The contingency plan must consider the ability of vital structures to safely dissipate blast loads. This ability is dependent upon their structural design and profile, distance from the detonation, and the amount of explosives. The objective of a car bomb defense is to deny a vehicle from introducing explosives within a determined safe stand-off distance: if a blast occurs, vital buildings must maintain their integrity and prevent radiological release. If the design basis vehicle's weight and speed are defined, then barriers that can effectively prevent entry can be designed. If the amount of explosives is defined, then analysis of topography, vehicle access, and vital buildings provide a basis for the vehicle barrier location. The location may be quite different than the protected area boundary, which is used if only theft defense is considered.