An Overview of ASSESS-Analytic System and Software for Evaluating Safeguards and Security

Year
1989
Author(s)
R.A. AI-Ayat - Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
T. D. Cousins - U.S. Department of Energy
J. C. Matter - Sandia National Laboratories
Abstract
This paper provides'an overview of ASSESS, a comprehensive approach for evaluating the effectiveness of facility safeguards against a spectrum of threats: insiders, outsiders, and hand-off collusion between insider and outsider adversaries. ASSESS version 1.0, completed in March 1989, contains significant new capabilities not present in the models currently used at DOE sites: ET and SAVI. The Insider module uses a reference database of defeat methods, strategies, and detection probabilities to determine the optimal theft scenario and Probability of Detection for each insider adversary type. The Outsider module calculates Probabilities of Interruption and identifies most vulnerable paths for a threat spectrum of: terrorists, criminals, psychotics, and extremists. A Neutralization module calculates the Probability of Neutralization of violent adversaries in a small force engagement for up to 30 combatants per side and 10 events. A Hand-off Collusion module calculates Probabilities of System Win against hand-off of theft material by various insiders in collusion with outsiders. This paper describes the scope of, and the relationship between, each of the six modules-Manager, Facility, Insider, Outsider, Neutralization, and Hand-off Collusion-in the integrated ASSESS package developed jointly by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories for the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Safeguards and Security.