Sabotage At Nuclear Power Plants

Year
1999
Author(s)
James W. Purvis - Sandia National Laboratories
Abstract
Recently there has been a noted worldwide increase in violent actions including attempted sabotage at nuclear power plants. Several organizations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, have guidelines, recommendations, and formal threat-and-risk-assessment processes for the protection of nuclear assets. Other examples are the former Defense Special Weapons Agency, which used a risk-assessment model to evaluate force-protection security requirements for terrorist incidents at DOD military bases. The US DOE uses a grade approach to protect its assets based on risk and vulnerability assessments. The Federal Aviation Administration and Federal Bureau of Investigation conduct joint threat and vulnerability assessments in high-risk US airports. Several Private companies under contract to government agencies use formal risk-assessment models and methods to identify security requirements. The purpose of this paper is to survey these methods and present an overview of all potential types of sabotage at nuclear power plants. The paper discusses emerging threats and current methods of choice for sabotage-especially vehicle bombs and chemical attacks. Potential consequences of sabotage acts, including economic and political-not just those that may result in unacceptable radiological exposure to the public, are also discussed. Applicability of risk-assessment methods and mitigation techniques are also presented.