GUIDE FOR RISK ASSESSMENT STUDIES REQUIRED FOR TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURES

Year
2010
Author(s)
Marie Thérèse LIZOT - ASN, France
Franck KALOUSTIAN - ASN, France
Gilles Sert - IRSN, France
Christophe GETREY - IRSN, France
Abstract
IAEA safety requirements are implemented in France for the transport of radioactive material transport. For use and storage of radioactive material, the applicable rules depend on the installation category: basic nuclear installations (INB), classified installations for protection of environment (ICPE), hospitals, etc. Transport infrastructures like harbours, marshalling yards, and truck parking areas are submitted to IAEA requirements but had no specific regulation relative to accumulation of dangerous goods and all the more of radioactive material. Recently, the national regulatory infrastructure has been completed with a requirement to provide for each installation a risk assessment dealing with health impact on populations in case of accident (French law of 30 July 2003 completed by the decree of the 3 May 2007 concerning the transport infrastructures). This law, relative to the prevention of technological and natural risks and also to damage reparation, requires that the transport infrastructure operator develops a risk assessment of accident scenarios with estimation of probabilities, seriousness, kinetics and health consequences. Accident severity may exceed the regulatory accident conditions of transport. “Domino” effects are to be considered. The result will be appreciated in terms of seriousness and probabilities using a criticality matrix with acceptance criteria that will be fixed by authorities. Means to reduce the risk in compliance with these criteria are operational measures or procedures able to reduce either probabilities or consequences. Transport infrastructure operators have to perform their probabilistic risk assessments by May 2010. A guide makes easier and harmonized the expected studies. The Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) and his technical support (IRSN) have been charged to produce the parts related to radioactive material. First, it was decided to consider a consequence level above which risk should be characterized, valued at 50 mSv, considering the Q-system reference individual effective dose, the limit for observed stochastic effects and the intervention level recommended for public evacuation in the French national transport emergency plans. ASN and IRSN are considering 10 groups of packages; for each of them, severe but realistic scenarios are provided with values of consequential doses.