Modification of Short Notice Random Inspection approach for LEU fuel handling facility by introducing the game theory

The short Notice Random Inspections (SNRI) are proving to be a practical method to make betyter use of the inspection resources while increasing the effectiveness of the interim inspections at LEU fuel fabrication facilities. The SNRI, with mailbox which provides the up-to-date operator declarations on the flow of nuclear materials, is currently applied at LEU fabrication facilities in Japan. The timing and number of random inspections established through a sampling frame that contains inspections opportunities and residence time for all flow items. However the safeguards approach for indirect use material at LEU fuel fabrication facilities and power reactors has to take into account the increasing emphasis on safeguards activities at plutonium handling facilities and on undeclared nuclear material and activities in the context of intergrated safeguards. It is argued here that the SNRI approach should be modified to take into account the effect of \"deterrence\" provided by the unpredictability compared with maintaining the traditional announced inspections. The possibility of modifying the number of inspections of SNRI's, through the increased deterrence, is discussed by introducing the Inspector Leadership Game, proposed by Proffesor Avenhaus and Dr. Canty, coupled with various parameters utilized in the traditional statistical sampling meathod.