Understanding the Nuclear Smuggler

Despite the active measures being taken by various USG programs to protect nuclear materials and employ nuclear scientists, the threat of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials in Russia is still very real. For the Second Line of Defense (SLD) program, deciding where to deploy equipment and where to invest limited resources is of the outmost importance. Especially in the Russian Federation, with its extensive borders and large quantity of nuclear material, it is important to determine which custom sites are particularly vulnerable to smuggling. Understanding smuggling is difficult because there are so many variables and perspectives one can examine. In this study, we have concentrated on the smuggler. This study identifies two primary categories of smugglers: professionals and nonprofessionals. It further divides nonprofessionals into two types: the typical amateur and the internal amateur. It then provides an overview of the factors that underlie each type of smuggler's preferences and operations; and finally, the study explores the use of scenarios as an analytical tool to help identify vulnerable customs posts. This study, developed for the Nuclear Transfer and Supplier Policy Division (NN-43) of DOE, is designed to assist in prioritizing sites within the SLD program.