TRANSPORTING NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE MATERIALS SECURELY

The nuclear transport industry has always recognised the importance of safety and security in transport. It has cooperated with the IAEA not only for the development of safety regulations but also for security guidance for the protection of fuel cycle nuclear materials to avoid unintentional exposures to radiation if there were to be inadvertent loss and negligence and also to prevent their intentional misuse. Safety and security need to be ensured in the transport of the various nuclear fuel cycle materials. The industry has successfully employed a range of protection measures for many years and has enjoyed an excellent safety and security record. Some materials require special security controls but some other materials, by virtue of their properties, do not require such elaborate provisions. If enhanced transport security measures are required for materials that do not warrant such measures this could deter potential carriers, cause unwarranted disruption to transport operations, inflate administrative burdens and exacerbate concern in the local population, The IAEA safety regime recognises the need for a graded approach to regulation. The current IAEA security policy framework should be capable of being successfully implemented by the nuclear transport industry provided that a stable and graded approach to security is also maintained. However, this appears to have been overlooked in some cases in the approach to the setting of appropriate security requirements. This could make shipments of some nuclear fuel cycle materials increasingly more difficult. Nuclear material has traditionally been subjected to extensive national protection measures and international agreements express the commitments of almost every country to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The IAEA carries out comprehensive safeguards activities to verify that these agreements are being properly implemented. However, we are now seeing an increased interest in having such strict monitoring requirements for nuclear materials of lesser consequence. Exaggerated perceptions of potential risks resulting from transport incidents have serious consequences which have given rise to significant operational problems and public disorder. It is therefore important that all stakeholders in nuclear transport operations should play their part in dispelling such perceptions of risk in the minds of the public, media and politicians.