U.S. TRANSPARENCY MONITORING UNDER THE U.S./RUSSIAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL HEU-LEU AGREEMENT

Year
1999
Author(s)
Janie Benton - U.S. Department of Energy
Joseph Glaser - Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
David Thomas - Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Alexander Bystrov - Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy
Vladimir Sinaevsky - Siberian Chemical Enterprise
Guennadi Skorynine - Electrochemical Plant
Abstract
The conversion of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) metal to low enriched uranium (LEU) takes place at four Russian sites. HEU metal to oxide processing began in 1994 with shipments of HEU oxide from the Siberian Chemical Enterprise (SChE) to the Ural Electrochemical Integrated Plant (UEIP) fluorination and blending facility. U.S. transparency monitoring at these facilities began in February 1996. In 1996, fluorination and blending operations began at the Electrochemical Plant (ECP). In 1997, additional HEU metal to oxide was added at the Mayak Production Association (MPA), and additional fluorination and blending operations have been performed at SChE. U.S. transparency monitoring at these facilities is intended to provide confidence that HEU weapons components are received, that the HEU metal is converted to HEU oxide, and that the HEU is blended to LEU prior to shipment to the U.S. Enrichment Corporation (USEC). The monitoring begins with observation of HEU weapon components in sealed containers, including confirmation of the 235U enrichment using U.S. nondestructive assay (NDA) equipment. The feeding of HEU metal shavings to the oxidation process and the subsequent packaging of the HEU oxide for shipment to the fluorination and blending facilities are then monitored. At those facilities, monitors are allowed to witness the fluorination and blending of the HEU into LEU. Monitors are allowed to use the NDA instrumentation to confirm that HEU is being processed. A series of process and material accountancy documents are provided to U.S. monitors.