Year
1990
Abstract
According to DOE Order 5633.3, facilities which process special nuclear material (SNM) must demonstrate capability to detect diversion or theft of SNM. The performance requirements are specified in terms of detection times and detection probabilities according to the attractiveness and quantity of SNM. When quantified in these terms, diversion detection elements associated with routine processing operations can be used in demonstrating a facility's capability to satisfy the performance requirements. Diversion detection capabilities arising from routine operations in a pyrochemical molten-salt extraction (MSE) process for removal of americium from plutonium metal have been evaluated and partially quantified for selected plutonium diversion scenarios. Routine processing activities include weighing and visual examination by operating personnel and also monitoring of MSE processing characteristics such as furnace temperature and stirrer operation. Detection capabilities arise from the nearly unique combination of high density, intermediate melting temperature, and shape of metallic plutonium process materials. Diversion scenarios involve removal of materials from authorized locations and substitution of surrogate materials to conceal diversion. Successful completion of processing operations also provides continuing assurance that process materials are present in expected quantities and thus may obviate the need for measurements solely to confirm that the plutonium is still present.