IMPLICATIONS OF IAEA INFCIRC/225/REVISION 4 TO CANADA'S NUCLEAR SECURITY PROGRAM

In June and October 1998, a group of physical protection experts representing IAEA Member States met in Vienna and updated Revision 3 of IAEA Information Circular 226 (INFCIRC/225), \"The Physical Protection Nuclear Material\". The purpose of the update was to reflect current practices in the application of physical protection measures for the security of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, and to respond appropriately to increasing concerns regarding the threat of sabotage at nuclear facilities. The Vienna meetings resulted in Revision 4, culminating in a significant reorganization of the INFCIRC/225 document: Clarification of the respective roles of the State ad those who are licensed to operate nuclear facilities and possess nuclear materials; and the physical protection measures designed to deal with the threat of sabotage. Canada, with a significant nuclear industry comprised of both power generation stations and research facilities, has taken a moderate, low-key approach to the security of its nuclear assets commensurate with the perceived low threat level. Canada regards INFCIRC/225 as the international guideline and, to a large degree, the standard for the physical protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear material. This standard is used for the systematic development of sound regulatory oversight procedures, while for licenses (operators), as an internationally accepted guideline promoting the development of physical protection system design and implementation measures. INFCIRC/225/revision 4, emphasizing state regulatory responsibilities and, in particular, the measures to deal with the threat of sabotage, has identified several areas where Canadian nuclear security legislation may require revision. This paper will discuss the principal areas of INFCIRC/225/Revision 4 which will be examined in the forthcoming review of Canadian nuclear security regulations.