Spent Fuel Transfers In Candu Reactors Under The Strengthened Safeguards System

Year
1999
Author(s)
M. Pellechi - International Atomic Energy Agency
Winston Alston - International Atomic Energy Agency
A. Al-Hani - International Atomic Energy Agency
Abstract
A medium term view is taken of the requirements of the IAEA's Strengthened Safeguards System (SSS) in the context of CANDU reactors with particular emphasis on the remote verification of transfers of Spent Fuel (SF) to the dry storage canisters. Improvements in effectiveness with regard to more meaningful verification measurements and maintenance of the continuity of knowledge (COK) on the spent fuel are given particular consideration. Enhancements of the current verification techniques of SF immediately prior to transfer of spent fuel to the canisters and the relationship between serial numbers and the burnup history are proposed. The need for maintaining the relationship individual bundles as verified and when placed in the welding cell and subsequently already in the canisters is analyzed bearing in mind the resolution of anomalies possibly resulting of loss of COK. An estimate is also made of the improvements in efficiency that can be noted in the form of savings in manpower over the current means of verification. The need for inspector-friendly, centrally controlled equipment and the extension to Remote Monitoring application is also discussed.