Technology Development for the US/DOE CRWMS

Year
1992
Author(s)
Roger S. Case Jr. - Sandia National Laboratories
Kenneth E. Sanders - U.S. Department of Energy
Abstract
It has long been United States Government (USG) policy to actively support nuclear nonproliferation efforts, as evinced in the 1970 U.S. ratification of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)1 and the 1978 US Voluntary Treaty with the IAEA (INFCIRC/288)2. Under INFCIRC 288, U.S. facilities without direct national security involvement are eligible for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Throughout the past decade, the IAEA has selected one or two U.S. facilities for implement-ation of IAEA safeguards at a given time. The facilities selected have generally been those which allowed the IAEA to test new or advanced safeguards techniques, facilities which were prototypical or similar to other nuclear facilities which they will have to safeguard in other countries, or facilities which have been engaged in international commerce in nuclear materials.