The Changing Security Implications of International Agency (IAEA) Inspection Activities at Department of Energy (DOE) Facilities

Year
1999
Author(s)
Marshall D. Kohen - Science Applications International Corporation
Joseph D. Rivers - Science Applications International Corporation
Abstract
Currently, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection activities at Department of Energy (DOE) facilities are limited to inspections within three vaults. This restrictive nature of the definition of the inspection area allows DOE to impose strict limitations to the access afforded IAEA inspectors. New regimes awaiting ratification and under negotiations will increase security concerns at DOE facilities. The Strengthened Safeguards System Protocol will allow the IAEA more flexibility in the conduct of its inspections. DOE will be able to reduce security concerns through site preparations activities, managed access approaches, and in some cases, by invoking the national security exclusion. The Trilateral Initiative will call for inspections at some of the Department's most sensitive sites, allowing measurements of weapons components. It is anticipated that DOE will need to rely on information barriers to prevent the loss of classified weapons design information.