Year
1996
Abstract
The dissolution of the former Soviet Union has focused attention on the security of nuclear material in order to prevent terrorist groups or radical states from acquiring nuclear devices. While the amount of nuclear material that the United States has provided foreign countries for peaceful uses is very smal~in comparison with the quantity of material in the former Soviet Union, the U.S.-origin material must also be adequately protected. Since 1974, the United States has conducted a program of bilateral discussions and visits to enhance the physical protection of nuclear material it provided other countries under “Atoms For Peace”. The major objective of the visits and discussions has remained the same since 1974—to help ensure that U.S.-origin nuclear material has adequate physical protection; however, some factors affecting the program have changed. The focus of this paper is on the changes. Both adverse and positive factors are affecting the physical protection program. Adverse factors include a perception that there is an illegal market for nuclear material, the possible conclusion of some states that it is cheaper and less risky to purchase illicit nuclear material than to produce i~ and a greater threat of sabotage. Positive factors are a greater capability of many countries to protect nuclear material, a greater international appreciation of protecting nuclear material, and an increased physical protection role by multilateral and international organizations such as the Group of Seven and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), contributing to a more balanced international physical protection infrastructure.