Year
1996
Abstract
The results of the 1995 ~ Review and Extension Conference have to be implemented. The overall long term objective is the universal application of IAEA Safeguards. An important individual issue, tri~ered by the Iraqi violation of the Treaty and enhanced by the problems encountered with the s4eguarding of nuclear material in the DPRK, is to strengthen the capability of the IAEA to &tect un&clared nuclear activities. Coping with this issue will result in a new safeguar& system which may overcome the &ficiencies of the past. One of the problems of the past was, for instance, the requirement of frequent as well as extensive inspections in large and complex fuel cycle facilities. In the Mure, inspection effort should be more delivered to sites which have been identified as problematic. Such sites could be i&ntified by the Agency using e.g. satellite imagery. The inspection activities carried out at such sites have to be specified and agreed upon. In conclusion, inspections should be mainly correlated with indications of potential undeclared activities. On the other hand potential trade-offs and technical improvements have to be taken into account when &signing anew safeguards system.