PROTECTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS MATERIAL IN RUSSIA: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL

I feel very nervous as I find myself in agreement with most of the priorities outlined by Ken Sheely and other members of the MPC&A Task Force. I take it as a sign of progress that I had much greater diff-iculty this year in providing the hard-hitting critique of the Task Force that Ken, Michael, and others always look forward to at the INMM. Nevertheless, I will try not to disappoint them. I will do so in the guise of reporting on the National Research Council’s recently released report. Last winter I was invited by the Department of Energy to make a presentation on what was then a study in progress by a small committee of the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences. That committee was charged with providing an updated assessment of Russian MPC&A capabilities--an earlier assessment having been published in April 1997.’ The new study was especially timely as it was initiated shortly after the August 1998 economic crisis in Russia. The Academy study, which was completed in March 1999, and released formally in May 1999, consists of approximately 40 pages of analysis, findings, and recommendations. What was perhaps most surprising, given the amount of debate which characterized the preparation of the 1997 report, was the quick consensus reached by the committee on almost all issues in the 1999 report.