Improvement of Safeguards by Remote Data Transmission and Evauation of Satellite Data

Some states violated the NP Treaty and thus compromised IAEA safeguards. The question arises whether an unfounded IAEA special inspection would be conceivable in every case. A systematic search of a country by inspection teams for undeclared nuclear activities, without reliable indications, is not politically enforceable and cannot be organizationally implemented by the IAEA due to limited resources. The possibility of the IAEA monitoring territories with the aid of civilian satellite-based equipment is discussed. The implementation of special inspections should not lead to a reduction of IAEA safeguards in declared facilities the number of which will increase due to the newly independent states. Current technical developments of safeguards essentially aim at improving efficiency without a loss in effectiveness. Integrated safeguards systems will be capable of collecting safeguards data unattendedly over a prolonged period. New evaluation techniques will further reduce personpower requirements for routine work. A more extensive approach is the remote data transmission of safeguards-relevant information. In this case, not only technical, but also and above all political questions will have to be solved.